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110 S KristinssonIntroduction are performed each year in this tiny country of about 330 000Surrogate motherhood has been prohibited by Icelandic law
since 1996, but in recent years, surrogacy has received
increased discussion and debate in Iceland. Couples have
sought transnational surrogacy in India and the United States
despite uncertainties about legal parental status as they
return to Iceland with infants born to surrogate mothers.
The Icelandic parliament has granted some of these infants
citizenship. In at least two cases, intended parents have
sought recognition of parental status in court, with varying
results (Fær að vera skráð sem móðir, 2015; Hagir barns
breyta ekki konu í móður, 2016).
This development in Iceland reflects larger trends of
increased cross-border reproductive care both within Europe
and between the Global North and Global South (Hudson
et al., 2011; Palattiyil et al., 2010; Pande, 2014). It has been
relatively easy to evade restrictive legislation concerning
assisted reproductive technology by travelling for IVF treat-
ment and gamete donation. Surrogacy travel is inevitably
more conspicuous, however, and it forces restrictive regimes
to make decisions concerning the citizenship and parentage
of children already born to surrogate mothers abroad. It
also forces legislators and the public at large to confront
difficult moral issues, not only concerning the acceptability
of surrogacy as such, but also concerning global justice,
human rights and potential exploitation (Laufer-Ukeles,
2013; Rotabi and Bromfield, 2012; Tobin, 2014).
A legislative proposal permitting altruistic surrogacy,
subject to strict regulation and oversight, was presented in
Alþingi, the Icelandic Parliament, in 2015. After a brief
overview of the development of the surrogacy issue in
Iceland, this article describes the main features of this
legislative proposal and then attempts to evaluate certain
aspects of it from an ethical and global justice perspective.
The primary method employed is bioethical analysis and
argumentation. Sources for analysis include the proposal
itself, parliamentary documents, stakeholder consultation
letters, specialist and media reports, as well as academic
literature on surrogacy issues from various disciplines
including bioethics, law, anthropology and social work. It
will be argued that the proposed legislation is a response to
problems generated by cross-border surrogacy in the context
of evolving, but unsettled public attitudes toward the
surrogacy issue. The proposal attempts to reduce the moral
hazards of surrogacy and is consistent with some of the more
promising insights in the current bioethical literature.
Although the proposed legislation is arguably an improve-
ment over the current ban, difficult problems concerning
evasive travel and global injustice are likely to persist until
effective international coordination is achieved. Despite
recent interest in this issue in Iceland, it remains to be seen
whether public and political attitudes are ready to embrace
legislation permitting surrogacy.
Assisted reproductive technology legislation
and the surrogacy issue in Iceland
The use of assisted reproductive technology in Iceland has
increased steadily since the birth of the country’s first
IVF-baby in 1992. Now, several hundred fertility treatmentsinhabitants (Saga, n.d.; Geirsson and Guðmundsson, 2014;
Óskarsson, 2001). Surrogate mothers are excluded, however,
by the Icelandic 1996 Act on Artificial Fertilization (Lög um
tæknifrjóvgun og notkun kynfruma og fósturvísa manna
til stofnfrumurannsókna 55/1996, n.d.), which explicitly
prohibits surrogacy (Article 6), defined as ‘artificial fertiliza-
tion performed on a woman who intends to carry a child
for another woman, having agreed before conception to
surrender the child immediately after its birth’ (Article 1,
author translation).
Surrogacy was briefly addressed as a controversial issue in
the 1995 commentary accompanying the legislative proposal
that later became Act 55/1996 on artificial fertilization
(Doc. 184 – Case 154). The commentary quickly dismissed
the possibility of permitting surrogacy by saying that it
raised a host of difficult ethical issues and was contrary to
the mater semper certa est principle, according to which,
the woman who gives birth to a child is certainly the mother.
Dominant public and political views at the time seem to have
concurred. A search through Icelandic media reports (using
the comprehensive database timarit.is) and the parliamen-
tary record (using the parliament’s web althingi.is) revealed
that public and political attention concerning this proposal
was directed primarily at the issues of egg donation and
donor anonymity, but not surrogacy. Only one parliamen-
tarian, representing the Women’s Alliance (Kvennalistinn),
mentioned the ban on surrogacy, just to assert the strong
opposition to surrogacy from the women’s movement gener-
ally (Guðbjörnsdóttir, 1995). No other mention appears to
have been made of surrogacy in the otherwise quite extensive
parliamentary discussions and reports relating to the 1995
proposal on artificial fertilization.
By contrast, visible interest in widening the scope of
assisted reproductive technology, even to the point of
legalizing surrogacy, has increased markedly in recent years.
From 2006, the law has allowed women in same-sex relation-
ships to undergo fertilization treatment (Act 65/2006). In April
2007, a couple posted a newspaper advertisement for a
surrogate mother willing to travel abroad for the procedure.
Prominent physicians, including the Director of Health,
responded openly by suggesting that surrogacy might become
an accepted form of fertility treatment in Iceland (Finnsdóttir,
2013; Jónsdóttir, 2007; Óheimilt að taka greiðslu fyrir, 2007).
In 2008, the law was amended again, now to include single
women (Act 54/2008). This time around, the possibility of
permitting surrogacy was seriously considered by the working
group preparing the 2008 amendment, concluding however
that this would require more thorough public discussion (Doc.
992 – case 620). Generally, Iceland would be classified as
having progressive public policies when it comes to reproduc-
tive rights and gender equality (Jafnréttisstofa, 2012), and
these developments would not seem surprising in that respect.
In September 2008, the issue of surrogacy was raised in
Alþingi (the 63-member Icelandic Parliament) when the
Minister of Health, Guðlaugur Þór Þórðarson, was urged to
commission a working group on the issue, which he did in
January 2009. In its report, submitted in February 2010, the
working group discussed ethical and legal issues around
surrogacy but concluded, as the group preparing the 2008
amendment to the assisted reproductive technology-law
had done, that further public discussion would be necessary
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clusion, however, 18 parliamentarians from various political
parties proposed in November 2010 a parliamentary resolu-
tion calling for the legalization of surrogacy in Iceland. Their
proposal underwent significant changes during the parlia-
mentary process. It was resubmitted by a multi-partisan
group of 23 parliamentarians in October 2011, and eventu-
ally approved by Alþingi in January 2012.
Meanwhile, signs of public interest continued to increase.
Fig. 1 shows the number of Icelandic print media items
(reports, articles and opinion pieces) containing the word
‘staðgöngumæðrun’ (‘surrogate motherhood’ or ‘surrogacy’),
based on a search in the database tímarit.is, which includes
nearly all newspapers and magazines printed in Iceland since
1920 (What is Timarit.is?, n.d.). Before 2007, surrogacy hardly
appears in these sources, and then only in connection with Act
55/1996. Since then, however, the term ‘surrogacy’ appears
regularly in Icelandic print media, with coverage peaking in
2011. A rudimentary count of Google-hits, using the term
‘staðgöngumæðrun’ and restricting the search to pages in
Icelandic, revealed a similar pattern, turning up virtually no
results prior to 2006 and a steady flow from 2010 and onward.
Possible explanations for this surge of interest include the
parliament’s involvement and other local events, which in
turn reflect global themes and developments. In November
2009, Staðganga, a voluntary organization supporting legali-
zation, was established by and for ‘those who need surrogacy
to have a child’ (stadganga.com). In late 2010 and early 2011,
the case of a child born to a surrogate in India for Icelandic
intended parents received media coverage for the difficulties
they had bringing the child to Iceland. Questions of filiation
and citizenship were unresolved and this prevented the
intended parents from leaving India with the newborn for
several months. The majority of Icelandic media reports
sympathized with the intended parents, who told reporters
as they finally arrived that they hoped their case would lead
to the legalization of surrogacy in Iceland (Vonar að mál Jóels
leiði til þess að staðgöngumæðrun verði leyfð, 2011). The
public appears to have been moved by these events; in
January 2011, a poll of a random sample of 890 Icelanders
aged 18–67 indicated 85% support for the legalization of
surrogacy (Market and Media Research, 2011). In March 2016,
this support had fallen to 52% according to a comparable
survey (Maskína, 2016).Fig. 1 Icelandic print media items using the term ‘surrogacy’.The parliamentary resolution of January 2012 called for a
working group preparing legislation that would permit
altruistic surrogacy. The working group of two legal experts
and one expert in philosophical ethics was established in
September 2012. Two additional legal experts were assigned
to work with the group, one by the Ministry of Welfare and one
by the Ministry of the Interior. The working group submitted a
legislative proposal to the Minister of Health in February 2015,
and the Minister in turn submitted it to Alþingi in March 2015.
The first round of parliamentary discussion occurred in
October 2015 (Staðgöngumæðrun í velgjörðarskyni, 2015).
When it became publicly known that work on the legis-
lative proposal was reaching its finishing stages, a number of
media stories surfaced of Icelandic couples, straight and
gay, seeking surrogate mothers, abroad and in Iceland
(Reyndu að leyna staðgöngumæðrun, 2015; Eignuðust barn
með hjálp staðgöngumóður, 2015; ‘Mikilvægt að leyfa
staðgöngumæðrun, 2015), and seeking recognition of paren-
tal status (Mikil þörf fyrir lög um staðgöngumæðrun, 2015).
In September 2015, state-run television ran a tragic story of
a woman who had intentionally become pregnant in order
for a friend and relative to adopt, but who subsequently,
much to her chagrin, was prevented by him and his spouse
from interacting with the baby (‘Ég verð að bíða’–viðtalið í
heild, 2015). The public and the media have thus followed
with interest any new developments in connection with this
proposal.
Despite the surge in media interest, especially around the
Indian surrogacy case in early 2011, it would be difficult to
argue that a great deal of genuine public deliberation on this
issue has occurred in Iceland. Sensational stories of individual
couples and reports of parliamentary initiatives do not amount
to a public exchange of opinion and argument. It is hard to
predict, therefore, how public and political opinion on this
matter will develop.
In fact, early indications suggest considerable opposition.
In the first round of parliamentary debate (October 20, 2015),
the majority of speakers were opposed to the proposal
(Staðgöngumæðrun í velgjörðarskyni, 2015). Reasons for
opposition included concern about the interests of children,
global justice and exploitation, incentives for increased cross-
border surrogacy, probable lapse into commercial surrogacy,
objectification and commodification of women’s bodies, the
rights, interests and autonomy of surrogatemothers generally,
lack of social consensus and contrary legislation in the other
Nordic countries.
Similar themes appeared in the comments submitted to
Alþingi by 21 stakeholders in autumn 2015 (Alþingi, 2015).
Table 1 presents an overview of the reasons stakeholders
stated in their consultation letters for opposing the proposal.
The most common theme is a call for caution when dealing
with such a complicated issue, where so much is uncertain and
somuch can gowrong. Many also stateworries about increased
cross-border surrogacy travel, contrary legislation in other
Nordic countries, exploitation and commodification, and the
interests of children.
An overwhelming number of stakeholders who commented
opposed the proposal in autumn 2015 (Alþingi, 2015). Table 2
presents the kinds of stakeholders who submitted commen-
tary, and the stance they took. Out of 21 stakeholders who
commented, 15 were opposed to passing the proposal and four
were neutral. The only ones supporting legislation were the




Complicated issue, too many unanswered
questions, too much can go wrong, too little
consensus and too little solid research exists
9
The proposal will lead to the normalization of
surrogacy and increased cross-border
surrogacy travel.
7
The other Nordic countries have not legalized
surrogacy and there is no reason for Iceland
to pioneer Nordic surrogacy legislation.
6
Legalizing altruistic surrogacy will lead to
commercial and possibly exploitative
surrogacy.
5
Surrogacy is a threat to the welfare, autonomy
and empowerment of the surrogate mother.
5
Surrogacy is a threat to the future interests of
children born to surrogate mothers, and the
interests of surrogate’s other children.
4
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causes of surrogacy (Staðganga) and artificial fertilization
(Tilvera). The National Queer Organization took a neutral
stance because of conflicting opinionswithin the organization.
The National Registry and the Personal Data Authority were
also neutral, and so was the professional organization of
psychologists. The two religious organizations submitting a
commentary comprise less than 0.5% of the population, but
the National, Evangelical Lutheran Church, to which approx-
imately 80% of Icelanders belong, did not participate in the
consultation process.
According to the proposal, the new legislation permitting
altruistic surrogacy would take effect on 1 January, 2017.
When the parliamentary session 2016-2017 ran out, howev-
er, the proposal had not passed the parliamentary welfare
committee. Given the opposition described above, it seems
uncertain when or indeed whether it will be reintroduced.
Regardless of how it ultimately fares in the context of
Icelandic politics, it is a notable attempt to replace a
surrogacy ban with a regulative framework that aims to
reduce the moral hazards of surrogacy.Table 2 Stakeholders and their stance to the legislative
proposal permitting altruistic surrogacy.
Stakeholder type Opposed Neutral Support Total
Professional organization 3 1 0 4
Government agency 3 2 0 5
Non-government
association
3 0 0 3
Advocacy/support
organization
0 1 2 3
Research institute 2 0 0 2
Religious organization 2 0 0 2
Individual specialist 2 0 0 2
Total: 15 4 2 21The proposed legislation on altruistic surrogacy
in Iceland
Key premises
The legislative proposal on altruistic surrogacy (Doc. 1141
case 671 /144, 2015) represents an attempt to realize the
aims and conditions stated in the 2012 resolution, according
to which the first priority should be to secure the interest
and rights of the child; second, to secure the autonomy
and welfare of the surrogate and her family; and third, to
enable the successful involvement of the intended parents
(Doc. 702, case 4/140, 2012). This is a reversal of the priorities
stated by the working group preparing the 2008 amendment,
according to which ‘the individuals who need to be taken into
consideration are first of all the commissioning couple, second
the surrogatemother and third the child’ (Doc. 992–case 620 /
135, 2007; p. 7). This reversal, putting the child’s interests
first and the intended parents’ interests last, is a fundamental
premise in the proposed legislation.
Another key development was that the 2012 resolution
repudiates an assumption explicitly made by the 2008
working group concerning the definition of maternity. The
2008 group said that if surrogacy were to be permitted, an
exception would have to be made from the Mater semper
certa est rule, that states the woman who gives birth to the
child is the child’s mother. Contrary to that assumption, the
parliamentary committee on health insisted in its comments
on the 2012 resolution that ‘nothing can take away from a
woman the right to be the mother of the child she bears’
(Doc. 4 case 4 /140, 2012; p. 9). This judgment is reflected
in the legislative proposal, according to which the surrogate
mother cannot confirm her consent to the transfer of
maternal status until two months after the child is born.
She is therefore the newborn’s mother and retains a legal
possibility of keeping that status should she change her mind
about the surrogacy arrangement.
Main features
The proposal defines surrogacy as artificial fertilization
performed on a surrogate mother who has agreed to carry a
child for particular commissioning parents, intends for them
to receive the child after its birth, and where they have in
turn committed themselves to apply for transfer of parental
status in accordance with the Children’s Act (Doc. 1141
case 671 /144, 2015; Article 3).
The proposal creates a legal avenue for altruistic surrogacy
but prohibits commercial surrogacy, defined as an arrange-
ment whereby the surrogate mother, or someone close to her,
receives money or other compensation for her carrying the
pregnancy. It considers surrogacy altruistic when a surrogate
mother intends to carry a child for particular commissioning
parents of her own free will and without receiving any
monetary or other compensation, except for reimbursement
of costs that are directly related to the application process, IVF
treatment, pregnancy and delivery (Article 3). To prevent
commercial surrogacy, advertising andmediation is prohibited,
and so is any giving, receiving, or benefitting from payments in
connection with surrogacy, beyond permissible reimburse-
ments (Articles 30–32). Although mediation need not be a
Fig. 2 Legal process of altruistic surrogacy according to the
2015 legislative proposal.
113Legalizing altruistic surrogacycommercial activity, the proposal’s commentary on the
relevant article explains that the purpose of prohibiting
mediation is to prevent such parties from taking advantage of
the vulnerable position of parties to surrogacy. Permissible
reimbursements are not defined in monetary terms but by
enumeration of the type of expense, and by leaving it
otherwise to be specified through government regulation.
In order for surrogacy to be permitted in a particular case,
an investigation into the circumstances of the surrogate
mother, her spouse and the commissioning parents must
confirm that they all enjoy good mental and physical health,
material and social conditions, and that circumstances are
conducive to a good, nurturing environment for the child
(Article 4). The surrogate mother has full autonomy con-
cerning all decisions regarding pregnancy and birth, and
enjoys the same services as any other pregnant woman, such
as maternity care and health services (Article 5).
The proposal stipulates that a Committee on Surrogacy
will be established (Article 6). The tasks of the committee
include issuing a license for surrogacy, ensuring that those
who apply for such a license have equal access to professional
counselling and determining paternal status for children
born in accordance with foreign law on surrogacy. Based
on fundamental concern for the child’s best interest, the
Committee on Surrogacy is responsible for upholding the
following requirements:
To qualify for a license, the surrogate mother needs to have had
legal domicile and continuous lawful residency in Iceland for the
preceding five years, and she must consent to the surrogacy. If
she has a spouse, the spouse must also consent, and their
relationship must have lasted at least three years. She must be
25–39 years old and have at least one child over the age of two,
following a normal pregnancy and birth, and neither she nor her
spouse may have lost a child in the last two years. Her mental
and physical health must be strong enough for her to undertake
the fertility treatment, pregnancy, and birth. Neither she nor
her spouse can be the sibling of a gamete-supplying intended
parent, nor can they be related to that parent in direct lineage
(Article 8).
The intended parents also need to satisfy various con-
ditions. It must be impossible for them, for medical or bio-
logical reasons, to have a child through their own pregnancy.
They must consent to the surrogacy arrangement and
commit themselves to apply for transfer of parental status
after the child is born. They should be legally domiciled and
have had lawful and continuous residency in Iceland for
the preceding five years. They must be of the age of 25–45,
have lived together for at least three years, and not be
responsible for the care of a child under the age of two.
Single individuals may become intended parents in excep-
tional circumstances, where the best interests of the child
are indisputably secured (Article 9).
Several restrictions apply to the origin of gametes. The
use of the surrogate’s own ova is prohibited, and it is
obligatory to use gametes from at least one of the intended
parents. The use of donor gametes is only permissible if
serious medical or biological reasons prevent one of the
intended parents from supplying gametes. The spouse of the
surrogate is excluded from supplying gametes and so are
ancestors and offspring of the surrogate and her spouse. Theancestors and offspring of intended parents are similarly
excluded and so are siblings of a gamete-supplying intended
parent (Article 10).
Fig. 2 outlines the legal process for altruistic surrogacy,
based on the legislative proposal (Articles 11–25 and 40).
The intended parents and the surrogate mother and her
spouse apply jointly for a surrogacy license, supplying
various documents and information specified in the law
(Articles 11–12). Applicants undergo clinical assessment at
an approved fertilization clinic (Articles 7 and 14) and
receive mandatory, thorough counselling on medical, legal,
ethical and social implications of surrogacy (Article 13).
Informed by counselling, applicants are expected to agree
upon a mutual declaration of intent (Article 16) regarding
various aspects of the arrangement, such as communication
during pregnancy, attendance at birth, care and custody
until parental status is transferred, etc. This declaration of
intent is not a contract and not enforceable except for the
possibility of surrogate parents demanding reimbursement
for relevant costs. Applicants also sign formal consent to
surrogacy, having been informed about its legal implications
(Article 15).
If the Committee approves the application, a license is
issued and IVF treatmentmay begin. A refusal can be appealed
to the Ministry of Health. During IVF treatment and pregnancy,
applicants are required to see a counsellor at least twice, and
once again after birth. While the intended parents may take
the child into their care immediately after birth, based on the
mutual declaration of intent, the surrogate and her spouse
have full custody of the child until the transfer of parental
status unless other legal arrangements have been agreed
upon. The ‘full autonomy of the surrogate mother in all
decisions concerning pregnancy and birth’ is prominently
asserted in the proposal (Article 5).
No later than two months after birth, the intended
parents need to apply to a District Commissioner for transfer
of parental status. For transfer to be issued, the surrogate
and her spouse need to renew their consent for surrogacy
no earlier than two months after birth. This allows the
surrogate mother to change her mind; however, if the infant
has been with the intended parents from birth, their case for
custody will become stronger over time regardless of legal
maternity. When (and if) eventually issued, the transfer of
parental status applies retrospectively from birth. It entails
that the child acquires the legal status of the child of the
intended parents and his or her legal ties to the surrogate
family are cancelled. The District Commissioner informs the
public registry of the transfer (Article 40).
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above is not followed, parental status can be determined by
the courts. This applies if the paperwork is not in place and
also if the District Commissioner considers transfer contrary
to the best interest of the child. The proposed legislation
contains various amendments to the Children’s Act to manage
possible complications in the process of transfer of parental
status, for example due to divorce, death, failure to request
transfer and failure to confirm consent (Article 40).
The proposal asserts the child’s right to be informed
about its origin (Articles 27–29). Parents are obligated to
tell the child before its sixth birthday that it was born by a
surrogate mother. At 16, the child can request information
about the surrogacy arrangement, including information
about gamete donor. Parents and child are entitled to
counselling in connection with these matters.
The proposal prohibits seeking, brokering or taking steps to
make use of surrogacy abroad that does not fulfill the
conditions of Icelandic law (Articles 31–33). It also contains a
provision for handling cases where children born according to
foreign law on surrogacy are brought to Iceland (Article 26).
Such cases are directed to the Committee on Surrogacy for
determination of parental status. The Committeemay confirm
a decision made under foreign law and report parental status
accordingly to the public registry. However, the Committee is
not allowed to confirm such a decision if it is contrary to the
interests of the child or basic principles of Icelandic law (ordre
public, public order). Decisions will therefore presumably not
be confirmed in cases of commercial surrogacy. In cases of
refusal, the Committee informs child protection authorities of
the child’s circumstances. The Committee’s refusal to confirm
parental status can be challenged in court.The proposal’s stance on ethical issues
The proposal takes a stance on key ethical issues concerning
surrogacy, including the following: (i) interests of the child have
first priority, the autonomy of the surrogate mother comes
second and the involvement of the intended parents last;
(ii) surrogacy must be altruistic, not commercial; (iii) surrogacy
must be gestational, not traditional, and neither the surrogate
mother nor her spouse may be genetically related to the child.
Furthermore, the proposal stipulates: (iv) the child’s right to be
informed about its origin: and (v) implies that cross-border
travel for surrogacy is wrong if it involves commercial surrogacy
or any other violation of the basic principles set forth in
domestic legislation.
Position (i) shapes the proposal in fundamental ways. The
interests of the child are served by strong requirements for
counselling and for ensuring that both surrogate and intended
parents are capable of offering a nurturing environment for a
child. The interests of the child are also prioritized by the
provision of information about its origins. The autonomy of the
surrogate mother is prioritized over the interests of the
intended parents by granting her full autonomy in all decisions
concerning pregnancy and birth. It is also served by stipulating
that she is the legal mother of the child, and her spouse the
legal father, until they confirm their consent to the surrogacy
at least two months after the child is born. The interests of
the intended parents are served by the very possibility of
becoming parents through IVF surrogacy. However, they mustbear the risk of not getting the child in case the surrogate
mother changes her mind; the proposed law does not allow
for the intended parents to abandon their commitment once
they have given their initial consent to surrogacy, unless the
surrogate mother decided not to confirm her consent to
transfer parental status. Should it happen that both sets of
parents, or neither, end up wanting to be the child’s parents,
the case is brought to court on behalf of the child, its parents,
or the intended parents. The child’s best interests then
become the determining factor for filiation. Conflicts over the
child are generally contrary to the child’s best interests, and
the benefit of professional counselling in connection with the
mutual declaration of intent, as well as at later stages, is
meant to prevent such disagreements from arising.
The priorities expressed by position (i) are easily defended
on moral grounds, insofar as many of the moral worries about
surrogacy reflect fears that the interests of children and
surrogates will not be sufficiently protected. It could be
objected, however, that the mater est rule makes surrogacy
less feasible for some intended parents, leading them to seek
surrogacy abroad rather than risking uncertainty about the
eventual transfer of parental status. In other words, by setting
such high moral standards for domestic surrogacy, the law
might in effect encourage cross-border surrogacy. However,
psychosocial studies of surrogacy indicate that prenatal
bonding is extremely rare, and it is estimated that less than
0.1% of surrogacies result in court battles (Teman, 2010). The
risk for the intended parents is therefore minimal, and should
not rationally deter them.
Position (ii) is that surrogacy must be altruistic. Altruistic
surrogacy may be described as involving a freely offered ‘gift
of life’, an expression of generosity and beneficence as well as
a sense of purpose. Although doubts can be raised about the
authenticity of such motivation (Ragoné, 1994; Raymond,
1990), about whether the surrogate can ever be duly informed
(Dodds and Jones, 1990), and about whether the expectations
involved in the gift relationship are fully realistic in the case of
surrogate motherhood (van Zyl and Walker, 2013), these
doubts do not carry the same weight as arguments that
commercial surrogacy risks treating children as commodities
and women as objects of exploitation (Anderson, 2000; Osberg
and Sherwin, 2006; Rotabi and Bromfield, 2012; Wilkinson,
2003). Although altruistic surrogacy is by no means universally
accepted, the most damning moral criticisms of surrogacy
have been levelled against the commercial variety, which
many commentators have therefore considered more contro-
versial than altruistic surrogacy (Þorsteinsdóttir et al., 2010).
Yet, the moral significance of this distinction is a matter
of debate. It has been argued that since exploitation and
oppression is possible in altruistic as well as commercial
surrogacy, there are reasons to move beyond these catego-
ries and frame surrogacy instead as a professional endeavor
(van Zyl and Walker, 2013). On that model, fair payment for
service is part of the arrangement without ruling out that
the surrogate is partly motivated by a genuine sense of
purpose and pride.
Another problem for position (ii) is that the enforcement
of a ban on compensation may require extensive invasions of
privacy in order to be effective, which calls into question
how realistically such enforcement can be expected.
Position (iii) requires a genetic link between at least one
intended parent and the child and the absence of a genetic
115Legalizing altruistic surrogacylink between surrogate and child. The main purpose of this
requirement is to increase the likelihood of a successful
surrogacy process by reducing the difficulties the surrogate
may have in giving up the baby, and strengthening the
intended parents’ commitment. A successful surrogacy
arrangement, resulting in a nurturing, loving environment
with parents who are at peace with themselves and the entire
process, is obviously in the child’s fundamental interest. On
the downside, this means that the surrogate must undergo full
IVF treatment, which is not without inconvenience or risk. This
requirement therefore appears to impose burdens on the
surrogate for the sake of the best interests of the child, while
also benefitting the intended parents.
These benefits of gestational over traditional surrogacy are
speculative, however, and it is unclear whether evidence
supports the assumption that a traditional surrogate is more
likely than a gestational surrogate to change her mind or to
have difficulties giving up the child. By contrast, certain
benefits of traditional surrogacy are confirmed by studies
suggesting that intended parents are more likely to show
traditional surrogates requisite gratitude and kindness (Teman,
2010).
The burdens of gestational surrogacy to the surrogate
should not be underestimated either. In light of the invasive
procedure, medication and surveillance involved, the pref-
erence for gestational over traditional surrogacy has been
criticized in the Indian context for favouring the interests of
intended parents and clinics at the expense of surrogates
(Pande, 2014).
Position (iii) may also be criticized for requiring a genetic
link between the child and at least one intended parent.
According to the Surrogacy UK Working Group for Surrogacy
Law Reform, this requirement discriminates against couples
who are both medically infertile and insults parents who are
not genetically linked to their children. This requirement has
recently been ruled unconstitutional by a court in South
Africa (Horsey et al., 2015).
Restricting possibilities of genetic relations among
parties to a surrogacy arrangement can be controversial in
other ways as well. For instance, the requirement that
neither the surrogate nor her spouse be genetically related
to a gamete-supplying intended parent may rule out some of
the cases where genuine altruism is perhaps most likely to be
found, e.g. where a sister or even a mother of an infertile
woman serves as a surrogate. Similarly, the prohibition of
donor gametes from certain relatives of the intended
parents rules out cases where altruistic donations would
perhaps be especially welcome and likely to occur. The
proposal permits siblings to be involved in surrogacy as long
as their gametes are not, and this restriction is explained in
the commentary as reflecting caution in light of the
potential risk of needlessly complicated kinship relations.
Position (iv) asserts the child’s right to be informed about its
origins. The proposal obligates the parents to tell the child as
soon as possible that it was born in surrogacy and conceived
from donor gametes if that was the case. At age 16, the child
also receives the right to seek specific information about
donors, and licensed IVF clinics take on a corresponding
obligation to maintain a register of gamete-donors. This
proposed regulation would change the current assisted repro-
ductive technology-regulation in Iceland, according to which
parents can choose between anonymous and non-anonymousdonation. The change accords with the Icelandic Children’s Act
from 2003, which explicitly states a child’s ‘right to know both
its parents’ (Barnalög 76/2003, n.d., Article 1). The comments
accompanying the 2012 resolution, on which the proposal is
based, state that individuals born through surrogacy therefore
ought to have this right (Doc. 4 case 4 /140, 2012; p. 9). To the
extent that public commentary on the proposal in autumn
2015 addressed this issue, whether in Alþingi or stakeholder
comments, it was overwhelmingly supportive of this position.
The assumption behind this proposed change is that
openness and access to identifying information is in the
child’s best interest. The validity of that assumption has
been challenged however (Frith, 2001; Pennings, 1997), and
further empirical research on this issue seems called for.
Empirical evidence should also be brought to bear on the
question of the appropriate age at which children ought to
be informed that they were born by a surrogate.
Position (v) states, in effect, that if surrogacy is to be sought
beyond borders, its practice must be consistent with the
principles set forth in domestic regulation. This may be seen as
reflecting Alþingi’s intentions, because in its commentary
on the parliamentary resolution of 2012, Alþingi’s welfare
committee stated that ‘if surrogacy is publicly prohibited, it
is very likely that people will turn abroad or seek other
questionable means’ (Doc. 4 case 4 /140, 2012; p. 11). How-
ever, it is very difficult to predict how, if enacted, this proposal
would affect cross-border surrogacy. On the one hand,
experience from the UK suggests that legalizing altruistic
surrogacy domestically may perhaps increase cross-border
demand for commercial surrogacy by normalizing the practice
(Crawshaw et al., 2012). On the other hand, recent compre-
hensive data-gathering in the UK suggests that this impending
boom in cross-border demand may be one of the pervasive
myths about surrogacy (Horsey et al., 2015). However these
trends lie, it is safe to say that most cross-border surrogacy is
commercial and it is therefore likely that if the proposal
becomes law, there will be cases where the Committee on
Surrogacy refuses to confirm parental status of children born by
surrogates abroad. It seems likely that such cases would then
be brought to court. In recent decisions by European courts,
foreign decisions on filiation have been confirmed based on the
child’s rights and interests despite conflict with domestic law
(Mennesson v. France, 2014; Skatteverket v. Brännström and
Nyberg, 2014). It seems possible, therefore, that legalizing
narrowly circumscribed surrogacy in Iceland will have the
unintended effect of opening the door to cross-border
surrogacy that does not satisfy domestic regulations. As already
mentioned, this possibility became one of the arguments
levelled against the proposal in autumn 2015.Should the ban on IVF-surrogacy be removed?
Should the Icelandic parliament, Alþingi, pass this legisla-
tion? More fundamentally, should it pass any legislation that
would legalize and regulate surrogacy, or should it instead
maintain the current ban on all forms of assisted reproduc-
tive technology-surrogacy? In effect, Alþingi has already
answered this latter question in the affirmative, by passing
the parliamentary resolution in 2012, on the basis of which
the government appointed a working group for drafting the
legislative proposal permitting altruistic surrogacy, subject
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good idea?
Although political ideology may play a role, it is hardly
the determining factor. Based on public speeches and other
evident involvement, supporters in parliament generally
seem more likely to be on the right wing of the Icelandic
political spectrum (The Independence Party and the Pro-
gressive Party) and critics on the left wing (The Left-Green
Alliance and the Social Democratic Party). Citizens who
support the latter two parties are also less likely to endorse
legalization than supporters of the former two (Maskína,
2016), but this difference has increased significantly since
2011 (Market and Media Research, 2011). The most signifi-
cant political arguments against legalization have been
feminist concerns about objectification of women’s bodies
and lack of genuine autonomy in the absence of full gender
equality. Yet, the 2012 resolution was supported by
representatives from the whole political spectrum, and
political ideology seems to have played only a partial role in
parliamentary or public debates about surrogacy in Iceland
so far. Instead, surrogacy has been framed as a moral issue,
albeit without any overt religious overtones. Supporters of
legalizing surrogacy have typically referred to the plight of
childless couples and the free choice of would-be surrogates.
Opponents have typically used a language of caution in light
of the imperative to protect children’s rights andwell-being in
the context of uncertainty about possible outcomes, accom-
panied by awareness that powerful emotions and untested
social forms are involved in surrogacy arrangements. In this
way, surrogacy has been framed as an innovative co-operative
scheme, entered into for a highly beneficial purpose, while
also carrying risks of serious disappointment, harm and even
exploitation.
Before drafting this legislative proposal on altruistic
surrogacy in Iceland, the working group solicited consultation
letters from a variety of stakeholders, including professional
organizations, NGOs, research institutes and government
agencies. The language of caution characterized the majority
of these stakeholder letters, all of which were written in the
year 2013. Many expressed scepticism that the moral risks
involved in surrogacy can bemitigated through regulation, and
quite a few stated an outright opposition to the legalization of
any form of surrogacy. Despite their caution and scepticism,
however, many of the letters contained helpful advice on
how to craft such regulation. This indicates that the letter
writers did not consider regulation a pointless effort. They
may have thought that although it might be safest not to lift
the current ban on surrogacy, the legislature nevertheless
might do so and because of this, the responsible approach
would be to take the opportunity to influence regulation in
a positive way. None of these consultation letters have
been made public, but many of the same stakeholders also
submitted comments to Alþingi in 2015, as already described
in Tables 1 and 2 (Alþingi, 2015).
The strong theme of caution and even opposition in the
consultation process suggests that the current move towards
lifting the ban on IVF-surrogacy in Iceland is not driven
primarily by indigenous cultural change in attitudes toward
reproduction. Instead, the main impetus seems to have been
the relatively sudden availability of commercial surrogacy
services abroad and the willingness of childless couples in
Iceland to make use of such services. The legislature wasthus reacting to the growing number of actual cross-border
surrogacy cases, which in some cases were sensationalized in
themedia. It did sowithout clear guidance from either political
ideology or social morality. This creates an urgent need for
sustained ethical reflection and informed public dialogue.
If the primary objective of the proposed legislation is to
deal with practical problems resulting from cross-border
surrogacy, it could be argued that what is needed is not the
legalization of surrogacy domestically but rather the clarifi-
cation of the legal status of children brought to the country as
a result of commercial surrogacy abroad. Why take the further
step of removing the ban on domestic IVF-surrogacy?
It is probably relevant here that even though surrogacy is
still considered an extremely sensitive issue, an outright ban
no longer seems as obviously justified as it did when the 1996
assisted reproductive technology legislation was being pre-
pared and virtually no public discussion on this issue had taken
place in Iceland. Public attitudes have evolved in the direction
of willingness to entertain the possibility of legalizing some
form of surrogacy. Removing the ban may or may not be
necessary as a response to current cross-border surrogacy, but
legislators and the general public have at least to some extent
become prepared to consider removing it.
A significant reason to consider this possibility is the hope,
realistic or not, that lifting the domestic ban would reduce or
perhaps eliminate local demand for cross-border surrogacy,
especially if regulation would also put obstacles in the path of
cross-border surrogacy travel. Reducing or eliminating cross-
border surrogacy travel must be considered a worthy goal
insofar as such travel utilizes surrogacy arrangements that
may involve exploitation or other human rights violations.
Although the practice of surrogacy varies widely, human rights
concerns, injustice and the potential for exploitation is well
and increasingly documented (Karandikar et al., 2014; Pande,
2010; Rotabi and Bromfield, 2012; Saravanan, 2015). Surroga-
cy travel can therefore be said to carry moral risk. On the
other hand, it is important not tomake automatic assumptions
about the actual risks of exploitation involved in cross-border
surrogacy. Examining such assumptions requires sustained
ethical and conceptual analysis of exploitation as well as
relevant empirical information (cf. Cattapan, 2014; Jansen
and Wall, 2013; Wertheimer and Zwolinski, 2015; Wilkinson,
2003).
If well-crafted regulation can create the possibility of
domestic surrogacy with minimal moral risks, such a
regulative framework for satisfying the domestic demand
for surrogacy seems preferable to maintaining the current
ban, especially when it is known that under a continued ban,
couples will in all likelihood continue to travel abroad for
commercial, and possibly in some cases, exploitative
surrogacy. As already mentioned, it is admittedly possible
that lifting the ban would have a normalizing effect that
tended to increase rather than decrease the demand for
cross-border surrogacy travel. On the other hand, lifting the
ban may also create an opportunity for more open discussion
and greater awareness of the larger issues surrounding
cross-border surrogacy. Such awareness may in the long run
create an incentive for potential commissioning parents to
be morally selective in their choice of surrogacy arrange-
ment. As a context for moral choice and reflection, open and
informed discussion is generally preferable to suppressed
private needs.
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actual cross-border surrogacy, it may be said that maintain-
ing the ban while accommodating children born to surrogate
mothers abroad could be seen as involving a double standard
(cf. SOU 11, 2016). It would be as if the legislature was
saying that surrogacy is morally unacceptable to the point
of deserving legislative ban and yet, citizens who wish to
have children through surrogacy can do so abroad and
have their parental status smoothly recognized upon return.
This would put such returning citizens in the strange position
of having done something abroad that their own society
deems completely beyond the pale morally speaking, but
will nevertheless tolerate for the children’s sake. Such
a situation raises concerns about the coherence, or lack
thereof, between stringent moral beliefs backing a domestic
ban on surrogacy and an accommodating attitude regarding
cross-border surrogacy travel. If legislation in this area is to
be based on communal or culture-specific moral values, as
opposed to a liberal attitude of registering private preferences
whatever they may be (cf. Ergas, 2013), the communal values
themselves should at least beminimally coherent. Themorality
underlying the domestic ban would presumably recommend
discouraging involvement in international surrogacy as strongly
as possible.
Put in a wider context, the legislature needs to make two
basic decisions: whether or not to maintain the current ban
on surrogacy domestically, and whether or not to ‘be tough’
on cross-border surrogacy travel (CBST). The combination of
these choices results in four logical possibilities presented in
Table 3. The legislature might: (1) lift the ban and follow a
‘soft’ CBST policy; (2) maintain the ban and follow a ‘soft’
CBST policy; (3) lift the ban and follow a ‘tough’ CBST policy;
or (4) maintain the ban and follow a ‘tough’ CBST policy.
Let us assume that if the ban was lifted it would be
replaced with a regulative framework that effectively
reduced the moral difficulties with surrogacy as compared
with some of the surrogacy arrangements available else-
where. This is indeed a defensible assumption. Recent
bioethical research suggests several measures for reducing
the moral risks and difficulties involved in surrogacy, and
some of these measures resemble features of the proposed
Icelandic legislation, even if the fit is not perfect. For
example, van Zyl and Walker (2013) defend a professional
model of surrogacy, emphasizing the moral (altruistic)
purpose, autonomy and knowledge of the surrogate mother.
Walker and van Zyl (2015) apply this professional model to
the difficult issue of abortion on grounds of fetal abnormal-
ity. Overall (2015) argues that intended parents should be
licensed based on a screening process, and Damelio and
Sorensen (2008) argue for education aiming to enhance
surrogate autonomy. All these arguments make the common
assumption, as does the Icelandic proposal, that appropriate
regulation can reduce the moral risks involved in surrogacy.Table 3 Possible legislative stances toward domestic
surrogacy and cross-border surrogacy travel (CBST).
CBST policy / surrogacy ban Lift and regulate Maintain
‘Soft’ 1 2
‘Tough’ 3 4Given this assumption, options (1) and (3) above involve
the possibility of a culturally acceptable moral framework
for surrogacy. Qualifying citizens and long-term residents
could then choose surrogacy as a legal option, within the
domestic health and welfare system, and without the risks,
uncertainties, moral hazards and great expenses involved in
seeking surrogacy abroad. Options (2) and (4), by contrast,
represent the status quo, in which domestic surrogacy occurs
‘underground’, outside legal frameworks and without the
benefit of proper counselling or education. Such secret
surrogacy arrangements may sometimes succeed without
moral problems but as some of the media reports referred to
earlier witness, things can also go terribly wrong (‘Ég verð að
bíða’–viðtalið í heild, 2015). and even when they don’t,
secrecy alone is a heavy burden. Options (2) and (4) also
mean that for those determined to seek surrogacy, the only
alternative to going underground domestically is going
abroad. As already explained, the option of regulated,
domestic surrogacy would seem far more appealing than
these two alternatives.
These are all reasons for preferring lifting the ban to
maintaining it. What about the choice between ‘soft’ and
‘tough’ policy regarding cross-border surrogacy travel? With-
out going into technicalities, a soft policy would generally be
characterized by leniency concerning the recognition of
filiation and citizenship of surrogate-born children, while a
tough policy would tend to refuse to recognize foreign
determinations of filiation unless they were compatible with
basic principles of Icelandic law or international obligations.
Domestic legislation, aided by institutional practices, may
indeed be used to either hinder or help intended parents
crossing the border with their surrogate-born children in
reaching their goal of forming a legitimate family, insofar as
this doesn’t conflict with international law. The question here
is whether there are moral reasons to prefer either a soft or a
tough policy in this regard.
There are, in fact, problems with both approaches. A
tough policy risks harming children, or at least not acting in
their best interest. It will usually not be in a child’s best
interest, for example, to be returned at the border,
removed from their intended parents, or denied registration
necessary for the enjoyment of common rights and benefits.
A lenient policy, on the other hand, may risk creating an
avenue for child-trafficking and encourage the use of
morally dubious and irresponsible surrogacy practices gen-
erally. Policy makers therefore face a difficult dilemma
concerning cross-border surrogacy, which arguably can only
be resolved through international dialogue (Ergas, 2013;
Humbyrd, 2009; Pande, 2014). From a moral point of view, it
therefore seems imperative to try as far as possible to avoid
the problems that can follow from both kinds of policy. If
this requires international coordination then such coordina-
tion seems morally required. In the meantime, individual
states should strive to maintain policies that are neither too
tough nor too soft.Conclusion
The legislative proposal permitting altruistic IVF surrogacy in
Iceland, submitted to Parliament in March 2015, is the
culmination of increased public and private interest in
118 S Kristinssonsurrogacy in Iceland over the last decade, and increased
cross-border surrogacy. The proposal prescribes thorough
regulation and strict conditions, based on fundamental
concern for the interest of the child, respect for the
autonomy of the surrogate, and concern for the interest of
the intended parents. It prohibits commercial surrogacy and
the solicitation of commercial surrogacy services abroad.
While it remains to be seen how such a legislation affects
cross-border surrogacy, there are strong moral reasons for
replacing the prohibition of all IVF surrogacy with a
regulation that would place surrogacy within a regulative
framework that protects children’s best interests and the
autonomy of surrogate mothers.Acknowledgements
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